Empirical evidence can be brought to bear on both sides of the debate and it is important to note that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, although this paper paints a somber portrait of foreign intervention, we do not argue conclusively for or against titling programs as exemplified by the Land Law, and it would be ridiculous to think that a country in Cambodia's situation at the turn of the 21 st Century could or should turn its back on foreign experience or guidance. Instead we offer this case study as a cautionary tale. Although we assume that legal borrowing is both inevitable and desirable, not only for countries in Cambodia's situation but for any country trying to improve its legal system, we argue that legal transplants present just as many dangers as any other form of social engineering. No matter how successful, it is unlikely that any transplant has ever functioned in its new context as it did in the old. They will always be distorted by the political and bureaucratic power struggles of the recipient society, which will be heightened in instances like Cambodia where the foreign sponsors themselves are deeply divided. When the destination society lacks strong bureaucratic institutions and the political structure is at best immature, the dangers multiply. Well intentioned and designed policies will flounder on the shoals of bureaucratic incompetence and corruption and the legitimate interests of large numbers of people will be ignored. This paper's contribution, therefore, lies not in providing closure to this debate, but in providing an account of how context, including the interaction of domestic and international bureaucratic and political rivalries, can and will affect the outcomes of attempts to create a new legal order. based system that emphasizes clarity and simplicity in land titling by recognizing ownership exclusively on the basis of formal registration with a centralized cadastral agency. The Japanesedrafted Civil Code, on the other hand, treats registration as establishing only a rebuttable presumption of ownership. These contrasting approaches not only reflect the national experiences of their drafters but also represent two opposing views of law and its role in social and economic development: Should legal rights -in this instance ownership of land -be made simple, clear, and universal so that assets can be easily exchanged in Coasian bargaining, an approach that some have characterized as "bright-line fever"? 8 Or should legal rights reflect and reinforce established local norms so that they integrate more readily into existing social practice?
Section III attempts to shed light on these alternative approaches by examining the current state of Cambodian land rights and land policy implementation. Throughout, the paper notes the ongoing tensions among Cambodia's various foreign patrons and the domestic ministries that have aligned with one side or the other. Section IV concludes with a tentative assessment of foreign involvement but without any pretense of offering failsafe prescriptions or best practices for legal reform in poor countries.
II. The Evolution of Cambodia's Land Law
Until French colonialization in the late 19 th century, land in Cambodia was the property of the king, but individual subjects had rights to possess and use land and to pass it to their heirs so long as they continued to cultivate it. 10 Individual rights to land that had been cleared and used 8 Fitzpatrick & McWilliam (2013) . 9 Research for this paper was completed over the course of three years including two extended trips to Cambodia. Nearly twenty key stakeholder interviews were conducted with staff at many of the relevant Cambodian Ministries, technical advisers from several of the major development institutions, country directors and program leaders of both domestic and international NGOs, and representatives from local communities affected by the land administration policy in the country. While the authors sought to gather a variety of perspectives on the issue, source interviews were not randomly generated and are not necessarily representative. Because of the sensitive nature of some of the discussions, interviewees' identities are not always provided. 10 See East West Management Institute (2003), 19. were recognized by royal proclamation when Cambodia became a French protectorate, 11 but the concept of fully private property in land in the European sense was first introduced by the Civil
Code of February 25, 1920, 12 which enabled occupants to submit a request to a designated official to recognize their private rights. By 1930 most rice-growing land was registered as private property, 13 but lack of bureaucratic capacity meant that only 10% of landowners received ownership titles, with the rest receiving certificates of possession. 14 This system of land administration remained largely unchanged through independence in 1953 and up to the Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975 when all laws became irrelevant.
The Khmer Rouge abolished all private property in land and destroyed all records of ownership. The state owned all land and allocated it for use by "solidarity groups" in a massive socialist experiment. The experiment failed. As many as 2 million people died during the Khmer Rouge's five years in power, and annual rice production declined to less than one million tons (as compared to more than seven million tons in 2010). These material costs were exacerbated by the elimination of almost all educated people so that by the time that the Vietnamese invaded in Cambodian. One key (French) participant described the process as follows: "Every draft was discussed by local institutions and the Cambodians tried to make it theirs but the first draft always came from the international community." Tellingly, the law's official domestic sponsor admitted that he "didn't understand the law" and that it was not "our law" but "the law of
NGOs." A longtime member of the NGO community, on the other hand, emphasized donor influence:
It depends how much noise the NGOs make about a particular issue and whether they are aware of the process before it is too late. Sometimes the donors require consultation with the community in promulgating the laws but there is still a lot of tokenism. The government just doesn't have the political will to get input.
The precise lines of influence and causation are unimportant for our purposes. What is important is that the law is the epitome of top-down social engineering with the added dimension that it was based on foreign models and designed by foreign experts with reference to global best 19 The law also provides for communal ownership of land by recognized indigenous groups although only five communities had been granted communal titles as of March 2013 (though an additional seventy-two villages have been recognized as legal entities by the Ministry of Interior and have nearly completed the application process). Rabe (2013) unlikely to be met given the difficulties implementing the titling system in Cambodia.
As with the Land Law, it is worth considering the institutional origin of the Code's rejection of the Torrens-style registration system. Japan's own law is closer to the American deed recordation system than the Australian system, and JICA experts were worried that the land registry would quickly be corrupted by local officials or become out of date as average Cambodians and leave open claims of equitable reliance that may further undermine the registration system. 21 Although these provisions have been interpreted to require that the possessor perfect ownership through registration to have effect against a third party, the Code itself does not specify as much or provide a mechanism to update the registry in this situation. In fact article 134 of the Civil Code explicitly exempts possession from the default provision that "a real right pertaining to an immovable cannot be asserted against a third party unless the right is registered in accordance with the provisions of the laws and ordinances regarding registration." Article 234 further undermines the authority of the registry by presuming good faith on the part of the informal possessor. 22 Some limit the Code's provisions on prescriptive acquisition to buildings rather than land, which would avoid some of the conflict with the Land Law's prohibition on new possession, but the wording is at best questionable. See e.g. Nhean So (2010), 5. 23 Arrunada et. al. (2005) , 709.
Cambodians failed to register subsequent transfers, as has been common place in titling programs throughout the developing world. 24 JICA personnel also felt that it was inequitable to favor the bona fide third party purchaser over the innocent original owner in the case of fraud. 25 Nor did they give credence to the Article 226 guarantee of state compensation to owners dispossessed by registry inaccuracies. Fearing low state funds and a lack of political accountability, a state guarantee was not deemed realistic.
C. Reconciling the 2001 Land Law and the 2007 Civil Code
To appreciate and discussions with people involved in their drafting make clear that the process has changed over the last 10-15 years. Initially foreign advisors completed the first draft and only later shared it with the Ministry; today the process has been reversed, as described by one government official:
The first step is to obtain input. Typically the ministry begins with the widest participation including local authorities, commune chiefs and district chiefs. Sometimes the public at large is invited to attend a meeting and to speak on the issue. With this information the ministry writes a first draft of the document reflecting the concerns and objectives of the various stakeholders. After a draft is established then the ministry does more narrow consultation with some of the larger national and international NGOs at higher level meetings. Next the donor community (e.g. ADB, CIDA, JICA, WB, DANIDA, GiZ) would likely be invited to comment and to ensure that the legal text is of a high quality. These last two steps might take place in working group sessions 29 At first blush it may seem that the Civil Code prevailed, but the registration project continues under the name Land Management, Administration and Distribution Program (LMADP), and the MLMUPC's allies are still involved. As one technical advisor close to these negotiations pointed out, however, it may not make much difference on the ground: "Both sides argued over this a lot, but at the end of the day the reality is that whatever is agreed on won't matter -things will progress the way they always have." Interview. 30 For a list of land related legislation, see Cambodian Council of Land Policy, supra note 18, 2.
or else through e-consultation. Finally the draft is sent to the Council of Ministries for discussion and revisions before it is sent to the National Assembly.
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While undoubtedly aspirational, 32 his description describes a real increase in the bureaucratic and legislative capacity of the Land Ministry and implies a higher level of commitment to the resulting law and policies than was created by the earlier externally driven process.
This isn't to say that more recent legislation lacks foreign influence. Ministry staff routinely conducts literature reviews of other country's legal frameworks to get inspiration for their own reforms. "We are just looking for places where the situation seems to be working well 
A. Registration
While technical capacity has improved and the legal framework is largely in place, the registration critical to the reconciliation of the doctrinal conflicts identified in section II has lagged, although not for lack of effort. As this section explores, the land registration process reflects well-intentioned but problematic policies that have served to weaken tenure security for vulnerable parts of the population. 31 Interview with representative from MLMUPC Legal Department. 32 One observer said that the ministry staff may still require additional capacity building to "fully grasp the whole picture of land management." Interview.
LMAP instituted a dual system of land registration procedures -systematic and sporadic.
The former is conducted by LMAP teams in pre-selected areas and aims to map and provide titles to an entire community. The latter responds to individual applications and targets only the applicant's land. Both are the responsibility of the Cadastral Administration as is the creation and maintenance of the Land Registry. 33 As of 2010 these processes had reached Phnom Penh and 15 selected provinces with registration completed in slightly less than half of those communes. 34 The systematic titling process has collected data on 2,053,062 parcels, 80% of which are rural, and issued 1,500,493 title certificates. An additional 607,784 titles have been distributed through the sporadic process, bringing the total to 2,108,277. The process has yielded over 10 billion Riel [$2,636,760] in cadastral fees, meaning that titling has become self-financing since the 2009 withdrawal of World Bank funding.
Unfortunately these aggregate statistics mask considerable disparities within title registration. First, LMAP's strategy was to begin systematic titling in areas that were neither "likely to be disputed" nor of "unclear status." The rationale was to focus on areas where LMAP could be most successful, at once building administrative capacity and gaining legitimacy for the program through early successes. 35 The result was that households and communities that lie in the path of planned developments or concessions or whose land is desired by well-connected individuals or companies have been excluded from the process. 36 Since neither "likely to be disputed" nor "unclear" was defined, 37 local authorities had essentially unfettered power to remove such land from the cadastral process. Although formal fees are reasonable, informal "fees" and the need to hire a broker to manage the process make the total cost much higher. Estimates for sporadic registration of a "small piece of land" were $600-$800. Another source estimated that sporadic registration cost $2,500. Sources agreed that informal fees also vary based on size and location and thus roughly track land value. 39 Shortcomings notwithstanding, the registration process has had some notably positive effects. There is evidence that systematic titling has improved access to credit as most banks will accept a registration certificate as collateral for a mortgage or other loan, 46 and possession or ownership certificates have proven useful in local disputes between community members of relatively equal status. 47 Another important consideration is cost: the cost per title of Cambodia's systematic registration system is among the lowest in the world. Before one becomes too optimistic, however, the scale of the task should be kept in mind. The total number of land parcels in Cambodia is now estimated at upwards of ten million, so while 1.5 million systematically issued titles is impressive, to title the entire country will take another 45 years at the current rate.
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B. Distribution
Since possession of land after 2001 is irrelevant for purposes of determining ownership, the only way to acquire new land, other than through registered purchase from a private party, is distribution of state land through the SLC or ELC process. 49 Neither process is simple.
Advocated at the time as ensuring legality and order, land must be formally registered as state land, confirmed as lacking a public purpose, and bureaucratically integrated into a specific 46 Interview with private real estate lawyer and former World Bank consultant. 47 Interview with country director of international NGO. 48 There have also been questions about the verifiability of these figures and a call for additional evidence of the number of titles actually distributed to individuals. 49 Complicating the process of distribution is the distinction between public and private state land and questions regarding the switch from one status to the other. State public land is reserved for public ownership and use, e.g., an airport or national monument, and is not available for distribution to private parties unless it is converted to state private land. Unfortunately, the criteria for conversion are unclear and the mandated categorization, mapping, and registration of state land in a publicly accessible database has not occurred, adding further uncertainty to the process. See Grimsditch & Henderson, supra note 36, 62-65. In some cases, the appropriateness of changing classification from public to private may be clear -a discontinued airport or a natural resource where the public interest has disappeared -but there are many situations that are less obvious and where the lack of clear criteria and bureaucratic transparency lead to the neglect of local priorities or corruption. For reasons of space and simplicity and because action has been minimal, provision for transfers to indigenous communities has been deleted.
concession before it can be allocated. Delays in the mapping and registration of state land and a lack of bureaucratic transparency have slowed and distorted the process and threaten to continue to do so.
Economic Land Concessions
An initial issue with ELCs is the opacity, at least to the public, of the process: "What has been agreed commercially in dozens of deals in every investment sector is regarded by Phnom Penh as confidential, despite the fact that the government is often selling or leasing public assets." 50 On the other hand, the private sector complains that connected individuals move onto land they know is about to be granted in an economic land concession so they can gain relocation compensation. Another indicator of corruption or at least strategic thinking is that ELCs are apparently politically timed. Many concessions have been issued immediately following an election but few before, implying that they are timed to avoid the negative press that frequently accompany them. The degree of irregularity, however, is difficult to pin down. One human rights activist complained that the lack of adequate notice and an effective means of opposition meant that the government could be indiscriminate in granting land to private companies when the affected community was too small to be politically significant. A representative from the private sector, on the other hand, voiced concerns that haphazard media coverage "painted all companies in an area with the same brush" and deterred companies from investing in an area for fear of receiving unwarranted criticism based on the actions of its competitors. A lack of consistent bureaucratic enforcement and the risk of unjustified negative press can lead Western investors sensitive to issues of corporate social responsibility to avoid the Cambodian market entirely in favor of Vietnam or Thailand.
50 Carmichael (2010) . Therefore, while SLCs promise an orderly mechanism for respecting the housing, land, and property rights of poor Cambodians, in practice they can mean a significant reduction in quality of life. Indeed one NGO reported of SLCs that "not a single one has been completed in accordance with the relevant laws" and that they "have perversely been used to steal land from the poor rather than provide it to them."
Social Land Concessions
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A recitation of the various deficiencies in implementation -families displaced from land they have cultivated for years, inadequate relocation facilities lacking basic services, valuable land given over to large companies in backroom deals -brings into question whether it really mattered whether Cambodia introduced the Torrens system or took a more incremental and locally sensitive path to land reform. If local governments choose to title only land where ownership is unquestioned, buyers and sellers even of titled land don't bother to register the transaction, the central government illegally favors multinational corporations and short-cuts the relocation process, and the courts are ineffective or unavailable to remedy legal wrongs, it is hard to imagine that the choice of one legal transplant over another would have made a difference.
Yet it is possible that the increased national ownership of the processes of legal drafting and institutional implementation will eventually lead to greater accountability. As foreign influence recedes, one can hope, if not necessarily expect, that the dynamics of land management will come to reflect the indigenous preferences of a country coming into its own after decades of 54 LICADHO interview. 55 LICADHO. As with the failure to update registries, the potential of centralized cadastral registries to provide opportunities to profit insiders rather than the intended beneficiaries could have been anticipated. The Agence Française de Développement White Paper notes that land rights are "often manipulated during land registration operations to exclude legitimate rights holders in favour of local and national 'elites'." Agence Française de Développement, supra note 24, 61.
trauma, but that process will at least initially depend less on the choice of institutional models than on the evolution of domestic politics. Given that governmental policy has been to start with the easy cases, with mixed results, optimism may be ill advised, and the overall lesson may be that undertaking grand schemes without a clear understanding of the local context and consideration for entrenched interests of implementing actors is decidedly risky business.
C. Connecting Legal Reform to Policy Implementation
Humility should be the watch word, however, in making even a tentative evaluation of Cambodian land law reforms. Time has been short; reliable data are scarce; available reports often mirror the interests of their authors; and finding an appropriate metric may be impossible.
Indeed the very goals of the land reform, integration into the international economy and tenure security for the Cambodian people, may point in different directions, and while judging domestic bureaucrats and foreign donors by the utopian rhetoric of proponents of land titling may be satisfying on one level, it suffers from the unacknowledged assumption of a contra-factual that might itself have had unanticipated negative consequences. The analysis that follows is offered with these limitations in mind.
The law and economics literature offers competing narratives regarding the shifting power dynamics between the individual and the state in the process of formalizing property rights. On one hand, robust private property institutions theoretically increase the economic freedom and hence the political power of individuals, making them less vulnerable to the state.
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On the other hand, the process of defining, surveying, registering, and titling formal property rights are invariably in the hands of state institutions, a situation that has led some observers to the conclusion that formalization gives the state "the opportunity to impose significant burdens on owners" while purporting to free the individual of governmental fetters. 57 The situation in Cambodia reflects this paradoxical world. The formal granting of ELCs to politically connected large industrial agricultural enterprises has undoubtedly increased their freedom from and power within and against the state and it has done so with the rhetoric of transparent and secure property rights. Even if we postulate that the government's reluctance to dispossess a powerful multinational is less related to law than to power and connections, the official celebration of rule of law values gives a form of leverage to recipients, large and small, that an informal system would be hard pressed to equal. This power of legal rhetoric is particularly true in a country so closely watched by and dependent on the international community. Those outside of privileged circles, however, face a very different experience. Not only may the relatively greater ability of powerful private entities to exploit legal formality further tilt the balance of power within the private sphere itself, but the state-driven titling process may also put them increasingly at the mercy of a state that may be incapable of vindicating their formal and informal interests even when it attempts to do so.
An obvious issue is the need for informal payment at every step. While perhaps normatively less objectionable in Cambodian culture, 58 the result is increased cost and complexity, both of which work against effective administration and the enforcement of legal rights. Then there is politics. Local government leaders, even if honest, often acquiesce in large scale land grabs because they fear state reprisals if they oppose politically connected outsiders.
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Nor do judges or cadastral officials offer much hope. They are appointed along party lines, and 57 Katz (2012 Katz ( ), 2030 One observer noted that Cambodians "feel compelled" to reward a civil servant working on their behalf, partly for cultural reasons but also because bureaucratic salaries are so low. 59 One observer noted that "Commune councilors blame the system and feel that resolution of the land administration system must take place at the national level." Schneider, supra note 3, 19.
political affiliation and prestige are often determinative of an issue. One critic quipped that "legal representation for the poor doesn't really matter because it is all about whether you can pay the judge off. It might be useful to have a lawyer to make noise and publicize your case outside of the courtroom but it has little effect on the outcome."
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Of course "making noise" need not depend on a lawyer. Nor need the judicial result be the end of the story. Dispossessed Cambodians are willing to take matters into their own hands through protests to the ruling Cambodian People's Party or symbolic marches to Hun Sen's palace in Phnom Penh. "Noise" can work:
One community completely avoided the formal land resolution mechanisms and instead sent a complaint to the CPP party representative in their province asking him to resolve their land dispute. The Head of the CPP formed a team and met with the villagers. Following the discussion the community was verbally allocated 1200 ha (approximately the land area they had requested).
While the verbal grant has no legal power it at least provides temporary security for the community and they saw results much faster than if they had gone through the Cadastral Commission. GiZ's parent organization, for example, has amended its terms of reference to include additional human rights protections. 63 There has also been discussion at the MLMUPC about instituting a 'one window' program wherein all the relevant authorities (e.g. the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and MLMUPC) would be available in one place to simplify the process of obtaining an ownership certificate. Banking services would also be provided at this office to avoid the need to pay cash and increase the transparency of the fee payments.
More than most, the Cambodian government must respond to an external audience, and the court of international public opinion is likely more powerful and independent than any domestic one. High profile evictions and protests over resettlement find their way into the media and reflect poorly on the government, which is often frustrated by its inability to match the activists' adroit manipulation of the international media. Since the government is dependent on foreign aid for the continued functioning of many core public services, the NGO and donor communities are powerful players in domestic politics. "The Cambodian government should really employ a top notch public relations firm to manage its reputation on the international 63 Interview.
scene," one private lawyer quipped. There are limitations, however, and they are not necessarily ones of diplomatic leverage. As the same lawyer pointed out, "The Cambodian government knows that the foreign donors won't ever really pull out since so many of the foreign advisers have such a nice life here. The NGOs will only push so hard until they realize that their home country is actually considering withdrawing support."
IV. Conclusion
Cambodia may be unique in the degree of foreign influence and presence, but it is not exceptional in terms of land law reform in the developing world. Indeed, it is potentially an exemplar of the intersection of two global phenomena, both at least rhetorically intended to alleviate world poverty and hunger. The first is the global push to increase food production by facilitating foreign direct investment in developing countries' agricultural sectors. The second is the ongoing effort by international agencies and donor countries to create "rule of law" systems in developing countries. These two have combined in Cambodia and elsewhere as foreigninspired and financed land law reforms intended to increase the transparency of land ownership.
Although the stated goals may include enhancing security of tenure for existing domestic users of land as well as increasing transparency for outsiders, they are universally couched in the language of facilitating market exchange. In a process remarkably similar to the creation of colonial legal regimes, 64 complex localized patterns of usage are simplified into something akin to the concept of ownership imagined by Western legal systems since the English Enclosure
Movement. Multiple users with fragmented rights are unified into a single entity with the power to exclude previous users and put the land into commerce; and the resulting interest is transformed into formal title and registered with central cadastral authorities so that the nature and value of the land and the identity of its owner can be ascertained cheaply, quickly, and conclusively. The immediate goal is to facilitate market transfers that will culminate in the land reaching its highest productive level, which will in turn achieve the ultimate goal of increasing economic growth and improving everyone's wellbeing. Even the condition of the holders of customary interests unrecognized under the new system will be improved as the increased productivity translates into greater general wealth and higher social welfare.
Or so go the dreams of those suffering from "bright-line fever." Ironically, however, the highest levels of agricultural productivity may be attainable by precisely the type of use threatened by entry of land into international commerce. Agricultural economists have long argued that agriculture, unlike most forms of industry, is not scalable and that the most productive form of farming is the family farm where the cost of both labor and its monitoring is lowest. 65 It is possible, therefore, that the conventional wisdom may fail even in theory, but the practical obstacles loom even larger. As long as the most common approach is universal centralized cadastral mapping, it is unclear that any reform could proceed without massive foreign aid and technical assistance. The use of satellite data to design cadastral maps may appear seamless when done by professional surveyors, but the software may not be so flawlessly responsive when the foreign expert returns to Australia or Denmark and is replaced by a rural Cambodian who has never owned an iPhone. Similarly a Torrens-style registration system may promise certainty in a developed society with an honest bureaucracy and a legally savvy population, but in a society where a bureaucrat can double his monthly salary by agreeing to 65 See Binswanger et. al. (1993) , 1164. The authors argue that political power and corruption of the type endemic to Cambodia have prevented the higher potential productivity of small farms from being vindicated by market transactions. The result, according to them and consistent with the appearance of corporate "land grabs" in Cambodia and similar developing countries, is the concentration of land in the hands of multinational corporations. See Narula (2013).
misfile a document or where a recipient of land from a relative or neighbor faces two days of travel and expenses equivalent to six months' worth of crops to register the transaction, human factors may quickly erode that certainty. Even if we make all the necessary assumptions, waiting 45 years for registration to be completed while meanwhile refusing to recognize informal possessory and use rights seems a risky course of action that may further impoverish the rural population instead of enriching it.
Of course impoverishing a proportion of Cambodian farmers or urban residents does not mean impoverishing Cambodia. What may be expensive and confusing procedures to a poorly educated farmer may appear transparent and convenient to a foreign agri-business enterprise with professional legal assistance, and the misfiled or disallowed evidence of ownership that dispossesses an individual may be precisely the administrative move that secures the multinational corporation with central government connections exactly the tenure security that enables it to move the land into international commerce and thereby increase the national wealth of Cambodia or at least the segment of society that benefits most directly from increased international contact and market fluidity and dynamism. In other words, the effectiveness of various approaches to legal reform may depend more on one's metric -increased aggregate growth, egalitarian land allocation, security of tenure for its own sake, etc. -and perspectivethat of an individual farm family versus a potential foreign investor or that of a World Bank economist versus an NGO rural activist -than it does on any agreed upon universal criterion.
As we stated at the outset, however, comparing the messy reality of a very poor country with a utopian dream of clear property rights readily exchangeable in perfect markets seems unfair even to those in thrall to the dream. It may only exacerbate that unfairness to replace the flawless top-down, technocratic utopia of formalization with a bottom-up romantic vision of rural communities with clearly articulable Geertzian "local knowledge" that will equally flawlessly lead to both maximum productivity and social justice. Neither utopia is likely to appear in Cambodia or anywhere else any time soon. It might be more useful to ask what the practical approaches might be.
While the 2011 legislation attempts to resolve contradictions between the Civil Code and the Land Law with some reference to the social context, the effect of the law remains to be seen.
Furthermore, even if JICA scored a clear win over the World Bank team, many of the fundamental questions about top-down, foreign-led legal innovation will persist. What might be heuristically useful, therefore, is some speculation on might have happened had Cambodia chosen to do nothing. Or, more precisely, if it had chosen to reject, politely, the wholesale introduction of foreign technical and legal expertise and attempted, undoubtedly with foreign money, to apply foreign experience selectively and with deference to whatever social and normative systems were (and probably still are) maintaining whatever degree of order and stability exists in Cambodian land practice.
An initial question, which we will only mention, is whether Cambodia would have been allowed to make this choice. The "rule of law" is a pre-requisite to some of the privileges of developing countries in today's world such as favored access to the U.S. calculus. For the present, however, the most immediate fact is that Cambodia has made its choice, and it is too early to tell whether the choice will be a wise one or whether, as the observer quoted earlier said, it will not matter because the political and social realities of Cambodia will overwhelm any legal framework. Nonetheless, keeping these fundamental questions in mind may not be useless as we wait to see how the Cambodian land law story evolves. 
